11.1 The Migratory Process: A Comparison of Australia and Germany

Note: the following text appeared in earlier versions of The Age of Migration. It was Chapter 9 in the Third Edition (published in 2003). For reasons of space it cannot be included in the Fourth Edition. However, it is provided here as a resource for teaching and study. It has been updated in 2008, and should be read in conjunction with Chapters 10, 11 and 12 of the fourth edition of The Age of Migration, which present broader dimensions of the process of immigrant settlement and incorporation into receiving societies.

This text presents comparative case studies of the migratory process in two countries with very different traditions and institutional frameworks. Despite these differences, there are significant parallels in the development of migration and ethnic diversity, as will become apparent. This leads to the conjecture that the dynamics of the migratory process (as discussed theoretically in Chapter 2) can be powerful enough to override political structures, government policies and the intentions of the migrants. It does not mean, however, that these factors are unimportant: although settlement and ethnic group formation have taken place in both cases, they have done so under very different conditions. There have also been differing outcomes, which can be characterized as the formation of ethnic communities in the Australian case, as against ethnic minorities in Germany. The examples gain additional interest through the major changes in attitudes and policies towards migration in both countries since the mid-1990s.

Australia and Germany: two opposing cases?

Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) have both experienced mass population movements since 1945. In both cases, foreign immigration started through the official recruitment of migrant workers. Early on, the areas of origin of migrants were partly the same. However, there the similarities seem to end, and the two countries are often seen as opposite poles on the migration spectrum.

Australia is considered one of the classical countries of immigration: a new nation which has been built through colonization and immigration over the last two centuries. Like the USA and Canada, it is a sparsely populated country which has
been open to settlement from Europe and also, more recently, from other continents. Since 1947, there has been a continuous policy of planned immigration, designed both to build population and to bring about economic growth. Immigration has been mainly a permanent family movement of future citizens and has made Australia into a country of great ethnic diversity, with policies of multiculturalism. After 1996, this model was challenged and important changes have occurred.

Germany, by contrast, is generally seen as a ‘historical nation’, with roots that go back many centuries, even though unification as a state was not achieved until 1871. Post-1945 policies emphasized the recruitment of temporary ‘guestworkers’, although there have also been large influxes of refugees and ‘ethnic Germans’ from Eastern Europe. Despite the zero immigration policy pursued after 1973, the end of the Cold War led to massive new population movements. Until the late 1990s, leaders claimed that Germany was ‘not a country of immigration’. Since then, however, there have been important changes in attitudes and policies on immigration and integration. These have been partly connected with the effects of a period of economic stagnation in the early 21st century, which has led to a decline of immigration and the re-emergence of net emigration of Germans for the first time for 40 years. Awareness of demographic trends (see Chapter 5 of The Age of Migration) has made German policy-makers realise that immigration will remain important for the economy in the long run, while better integration of minorities arising through past immigration has become a high priority.

In comparing the two countries, we shall look at the way the migratory process is shaped by a number of factors: the origins and developments of migratory flows; labour market incorporation; the development of immigrant communities; the evolution of legal frameworks and government policies; and the immigrants’ various forms of interaction with the society of the receiving country. In the German case, the increasing significance of European Union policies on immigration, asylum and equal opportunities has also played a part, while for Australia the growth of economic and cultural links with Asia has been important.

The tables below give figures for the immigrant populations in the two countries. The data for Australia are birthplace figures, as many overseas-born people have become citizens. About 22 per cent of the total population in 2006 were born
overseas. The previous Census in 2001 had shown that, in addition, about 27 per cent of those born in Australia had at least one immigrant parent. Thus nearly half the Australian population were either born overseas or had one or both parents born overseas – the highest proportion anywhere (except Israel). The 2006 Census also counted 455 000 Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders (2.3 per cent of the total population) who are the only true ‘non-immigrants’ in Australia.

In 2005, Germany had 6.8 million foreign residents (8.2 per cent of the total population). This appears to show a decline from a foreign population of 7.3 million in 2000 (8.9 percent of the total population). However, this does not represent a real reduction, but rather the results of a revision of population registers to take account of departures. For the first time, Germany published figures on the foreign-born population for the year 2003, showing the presence of 10.6 million foreign-born persons – 12.9 per cent of its total population of 82.5 million. Unfortunately, however, no breakdown of the foreign born by origin appears to be available. (See the ‘note on migration statistics’ at the beginning of The Age of Migration for explanation of these statistical categories).

**Origins and development of the migratory movements**

Migratory movements to Australia and Germany are described in Chapters 4 and 5 of The Age of Migration. Here, we will discuss differences and similarities in the post-1945 immigration experiences.

In 1947, the Australian government started a large-scale immigration programme, designed to increase the population for both strategic and economic reasons. The original aim was to attract British settlers, but areas of origin quickly became more diverse. In the late 1940s, many immigrants came from Eastern and Central Europe, while in the 1950s and 1960s Southern Europeans predominated. Many Eastern Europeans were selected for settlement from displaced persons camps, while Southern Europeans were recruited through bilateral agreements with the Italian, Greek and Maltese governments. Since the Australian government wanted both workers and settlers, initial recruitment led to processes of chain migration, through which early migrants helped relatives, friends and fellow villagers to come and join them.
### Table 1  Australia: Immigrant population by birthplace (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2197</td>
<td>2234</td>
<td>2299</td>
<td>2133</td>
<td>2078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK and Ireland</strong></td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td>1086</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>290</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Former) Yugoslavia</strong></td>
<td>130</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greece</strong></td>
<td>160</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>111</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Europe</strong></td>
<td>418</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (incl. Middle East)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa and Middle East</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East Asia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern and Central Asia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total immigrant population</strong></td>
<td>2563</td>
<td>2969</td>
<td>3676</td>
<td>3988</td>
<td>4381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** The data are taken from final Australian Census reports, except the 2006 material, which are authors’ calculations based on the preliminary results of the 2006 Census. In addition, the geographical distribution for 2006 is different than that used for other years. The symbol – indicates not an absence of migrants, but that these are aggregated elsewhere. The New Zealand figure for 2006 is an estimate based on population flow data from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA, 2007).
Table 2 Foreign residents in Germany (thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1462</td>
<td>1695</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>1347</td>
<td>2083</td>
<td>2213</td>
<td>2099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4453</strong></td>
<td><strong>5343</strong></td>
<td><strong>7174</strong></td>
<td><strong>7297</strong></td>
<td><strong>6756</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which EC/EU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1632</td>
<td>1812</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>2162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Official data for Germany have been presented differently over the years due to political changes as well as shifts in migration patterns. The figures are for 31 December and apply to the old Länder of the pre-reunification Federal Republic of Germany up to 1990 and to the whole of Germany for 1995, 2000 and 2005. Yugoslavia included Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in 1980 and 1990, but these new states are shown separately in later years. EC/EU refers to the composition of the European Community or the European Union at the time of the data. Some countries (especially in Eastern Europe) were not listed separately in earlier years due to relatively low migration flows. The symbol – therefore indicates not an absence of migrants, but that these are aggregated elsewhere. The 2005 figure for EU is an authors’ calculation from various data.

Sources: (OECD, 1992: Table 10; 2001: Table B.1.5; 2007: Table B.1.5).
Germany has had several major migratory movements since 1945. The first and largest was that of over 8 million expellees (Heimatvertriebene) from the lost eastern parts of the Reich and 3 million refugees (Flüchtlinge) who came to the FRG from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) up to 1961. These people were regarded as being of German ethnic origins, and immediately became citizens of the FRG. Despite initial strains, they were absorbed into the population, providing a willing source of labour for Germany’s ‘economic miracle’ (Kindleberger, 1967).

The next major movement - that of ‘guestworkers’ from the Mediterranean area - was to be the one that did most to turn Germany into a multi-ethnic society. As in Australia, government labour recruitment was the driving force, but there was a major difference: ‘guestworkers’ were not meant to settle permanently (see Box 5.1 in The Age of Migration). The ‘guestworker’ system was designed to recruit manual workers (both male and female) to work in factories and other low-skilled jobs in Germany. Foreign workers had a special legal status which restricted family reunion, limited labour market and social rights, and gave little chance of becoming citizens. But the ending of labour recruitment in 1973 led to trends towards family reunion and permanent settlement. Many Southern Europeans did leave, but those who stayed were mainly from the more distant and culturally-different sending countries, especially Turkey and Yugoslavia.

The Turkish case illustrates how temporary migration became transformed into settlement and community formation. Turkey had no tradition of international labour migration: the initial movement was a result of German recruitment policies. The Turkish government hoped to relieve domestic unemployment and to obtain foreign exchange through worker remittances. The migrants themselves sought an escape from poverty, unemployment and dependence on semi-feudal landowners. It was hoped that money earned and skills gained abroad would encourage economic development at home. Thus the Turkish participants initially shared the German expectation of temporary migration. However, when Germany stopped recruitment in 1973, many Turkish workers stayed on, and family reunion continued. Migrants realized that economic conditions at home were bad, and that there would be no opportunity to re-migrate to Germany later. In 1974, there were just over 1 million Turkish residents out of a total foreign population of 4.1 million. Their number grew
to 1.6 million by 1982, and to 2 million by 1995. Family reunion was not the only form of continued migration: political unrest and ethnic conflict in Turkey generated waves of asylum seekers, who found shelter in Turkish and Kurdish communities abroad. German government policies were ineffective in preventing further immigration and settlement. Mass deportation, though debated, was never a real option for a democratic state, committed to a wide range of international agreements.

By the mid-1970s, both Australia and Germany had large permanent settler populations. Australian authorities accepted settlement and were beginning to seek ways of managing cultural diversity. Germany, by contrast, officially denied the reality of settlement. From the late 1970s, both countries experienced new forms of immigration, leading to even greater diversity.

Australia’s immigration intakes became global in scope. The White Australia Policy was formally abandoned in 1973, and large-scale Asian immigration began in the late 1970s with the arrival of Indo-Chinese refugees. By the mid-1980s, Asia was the source of 40-50 per cent of entries. Australia also attracted Latin Americans (both workers and refugees) and Africans (in small numbers at first). Immigration of New Zealanders (who can enter freely) also grew. In the 1990s, economic and political crises brought about new inflows from the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and South Africa, while in the early twenty-first century many Africans (especially from Sudan) were admitted as refugees. Both skilled migration and refugee entry led to entry of dependants.

The changing composition of immigrant intakes reflects these changes. In 1962-3, 84 per cent of settler arrivals came from eight European countries, led by the UK (44 per cent). (Australian migration statistics relate to financial years, from July to June.) The rest were mainly from Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Spain, Malta, Germany and the Netherlands. New Zealand (1.3 per cent) and Egypt (1.1 per cent) were the only non-European countries in the top ten (Shu et al., 1994). In 2005-6, by contrast, the UK was still the number one origin area for settler arrivals but was down to 17 percent of the total, followed by New Zealand (14 percent), China (8 percent), India (9 percent), Philippines (4 percent) Sudan (3 percent), South Africa (3 percent). Europeans made up only 23 percent of new settlers in 2005-6, considerably outnumbered by Asians (40 percent). Then came settlers from Oceania (17 percent),
North Africa and the Middle East (9 percent) and Sub-Saharan Africa (8 percent) (DIAC, 2007a).

Australia maintains a regular Migration Program planned by the government on the basis of economic, social and humanitarian considerations. Permanent non-humanitarian arrivals averaged 110 000 per year in the 1980s and 90 000 per year in the 1990s. This does not include entrants from New Zealand, who can enter freely.

The Centre-Right Coalition Government elected in 1996 set out to re-orient immigration to focus on economic benefits for Australia – mainly by giving precedence to skilled and temporary migration. By 2005-6, permanent non-humanitarian inflows totalled 142 930, the highest for over a decade (DIAC, 2007c). Of these, about 70 per cent were in the skilled migrant category. It remains to be seen whether the Australian Labor Party Government elected in November 2007 will change migration policies. The 2008-09 Migration Program gives an early indication: the planned intake has been raised to 190 300, which includes 56 500 places for family migrants who are sponsored by family members already in Australia and 133 500 places for skilled migrants who gain entry essentially because of their work or business skills (DIAC, 2008). This shows considerable continuity with the recent past.

Australia’s integration into global and regional economic networks has also led to increased temporary migration – a departure from Australia’s traditional focus on permanent settlers. In 2000-1, 160 157 temporary residence permits were issued, of which 45 669 were for skilled workers. Growth is continuing, and in 2005-6, 224 962 temporary resident visas were issued, 74 666 of them for skilled employment.

Emigration by Australians is also increasing. Working abroad has become an important part of professional and personal experience, and it is believed that as many as 800 000 Australian citizens currently live overseas.

Australia’s Humanitarian Program has averaged 12 000 entrants per year since the early 1990s. In 2005-6, 14 144 persons were admitted under the Humanitarian Program (the highest figure for years) (DIAC, 2007b). Australia remains one of only about ten countries in the world that have programmes to resettle refugees from countries of first asylum in collaboration with the UNHCR. However, since the late 1990s a growing number of asylum seekers have arrived illegally by boat (see Box:
Australia’s immigration panic and the ‘Tampa Affair’.

Australian immigration also has regional dimensions. Since 1947, most migrants have tended to go to areas of rapid industrial development, especially the State of New South Wales (NSW) and its capital city Sydney, and the State of Victoria and its capital Melbourne. Although migrants have always also gone to other states, the numbers have been smaller, and ethnic communities make up a smaller share in the total populations. In recent years, the State Government of NSW has become concerned about rapid population growth and possible environmental strains, and has called for policies to encourage migrants to go to country areas or to other states. At the same time, states like Western Australia and South Australia have become worried about lack of labour market entrants and loss of population to other states. The mineral boom of the early 2000s led to intensified efforts by such state governments to attract migrants – both permanent and temporary. Similarly, country areas throughout Australia have welcomed measures to encourage migrants to settle there. For instance, medical personnel willing to work for a certain period in country areas are given preferential immigration treatment, while refugees have been encouraged to take up work in regional towns.

Box: Australia’s immigration panic and the ‘Tampa Affair’

Due to its inaccessibility, Australia has had little illegal immigration in the past. Immigration has always been a political issue, but the level of conflict has been limited. This situation changed dramatically after 1996 due to two factors: the rise of the One Nation Party and the increase in arrivals of boat people. Matters came to a head in 2001 with the ‘Tampa Affair’ and a Federal Election fought largely on immigration.

During the March 1996 Federal Election, a Liberal Party candidate in Queensland, Pauline Hanson, attacked services for Aboriginal people in such an extreme way that she was disendorsed as a candidate by her party. Yet she won the seat as an Independent, and quickly set up the One Nation Party, which sought to build on anti-minority feelings. In her inaugural speech in the Federal Parliament, Hanson attacked Aboriginal people, called for the stopping of immigration and the abolition of multiculturalism, and warned of ‘the Asianization’ of Australia. Both the
ruling Liberal-National Coalition and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) were slow to condemn Hanson’s politics. The trend towards racialization of politics had immediate effects. The tightening of immigration policy was targeted at categories which were claimed to be hurting national interests: family reunion and asylum seekers. The result was a much more hostile climate towards immigration and multiculturalism.

The situation was exacerbated by the increase in boat-people arrivals in northern Australia. These fell into two main groups: Chinese people being smuggled in to work, and asylum seekers from Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries brought in from Indonesia, usually on fishing boats chartered by people smugglers. Numbers were not high by international standards, never going much above 4000 in a year, but they provoked hostile media campaigns and popular outrage. Immigration Minister Ruddock attacked the asylum seekers as ‘queue jumpers’ claiming that they took places from ‘genuine’ refugees allocated by UNHCR. He declared that boat people were a threat to Australian sovereignty. In 1999 the government introduced the three-year Temporary Protection Visa (TPV), which conferred no right to permanent settlement or family reunion. Another deterrent was to stop boat people from landing on Australian shores, and to try to send them back to Indonesia. Those who did land were detained in isolated and remote camps, where they were isolated from lawyers, the media and supporters. As a result, they might languish in mandatory detention for up to three years. Hunger strikes, riots, self-inflicted injuries and even suicide became commonplace. The government also introduced legal measures to limit the power of the courts in asylum matters (Crock and Saul, 2002: Chapter S).

Matters got even worse in August 2001, when the Norwegian freighter MV *Tampa* picked up over 400 asylum seekers (mainly from Afghanistan and Iraq) from a sinking boat off Northern Australia. The government refused the captain permission to land, and the *Tampa* anchored near the Australian territory of Christmas Island. This was the start of a saga involving international diplomacy, heated public debates in Australia, and feverish political activity. In the ‘Pacific Solution’, Australia tried to export the asylum seekers to its neighbours, Nauru and New Guinea - and was willing to spend vast sums of money in doing so. Asylum became the central issue in the November Election, giving victory to Liberal-National Prime Minister Howard. Before the *Tampa* affair, a Labour victory had been predicted. The 2002-3 Federal
Budget included A$2.8 billion for border control measures - an increase of A$1.2 billion over the previous year. Even stricter border control legislation was introduced in 2002 (Castles and Vasta, 2004).

The ALP Government that came to power in late 2007 set to abolish the ‘Pacific Solution’ by closing asylum camps outside Australia and returning to onshore processing. Nonetheless, detention camps in remote areas still remain, and Australia seems to be persisting in its negative stance towards asylum claims.

Germany has had three main types of immigration in recent years: first, entries of asylum seekers from Eastern Europe and from non-European countries; second, entries of economic migrants (both skilled and unskilled, documented and undocumented) from Europe and outside; and, third, immigration of Aussiedler or ‘ethnic Germans’ from the former Soviet Union, Poland, Romania and other Eastern European countries.

Article 16 of Germany’s 1948 Basic Law laid down a right for victims of persecution to seek asylum. Until 1993, anybody who claimed to be an asylum seeker was permitted to stay pending an official decision on refugee status, which often took several years. Asylum-seeker movement became significant in the late 1970s, and grew fast as the Soviet Bloc imploded, reaching 100 000 in 1986, 193 000 in 1990, and 438 000 in 1992 (OECD, 1995: 195). In 1992, there was an upsurge in asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia. At first, many were gypsies, as were the majority of asylum seekers from Romania. This ethnic group became the main target of racist violence in mid-1992. Asylum-seeker flows grew sharply during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by 1995 Germany was host to 345 000 displaced persons from former Yugoslavia (UNHCR, 2000: 239).

Fears of mass East-West and South-North migrations of desperate and impoverished people were seized on by the extreme right, and there was an upsurge in racist incidents. After a lengthy and emotional debate, Paragraph 16 of the Basic Law was amended in 1993, allowing German frontier police to reject asylum seekers for a variety of reasons. Measures were also taken to speed up the processing of applications. After 1995, Germany made agreements with the Bosnian and Serbian
governments to facilitate repatriation. People fleeing from Kosovo in 1999 received temporary protection, but most were repatriated quickly after the crisis. In 1999, refugees and asylum seekers made up 1.2 million of Germany’s 7.3 million foreign residents. Over 400 000 of these were ‘de facto refugees’ - persons denied refugee status, but unable or unwilling to leave for political reasons or fear of persecution (OECD, 2001: 173). As a result of the implementation of stricter measures, asylum applications fell to 322 600 in 1993, 116 400 in 1996 and just 29 000 in 2005 (OECD, 2001, 170. OECD, 2007, 248).

Germany ended recruitment of migrant labour in 1973, but reintroduced temporary labour schemes for workers from Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries in the 1990s. Some 22 000 contract workers were admitted in 2005. Seasonal workers are also admitted for up to three months per year for work in agriculture, hotels and catering. There were 330 000 seasonal workers in 2005 (OECD, 2007, 248-9). Such temporary migration has declined in recent years: in view of relatively high unemployment in Germany, the labour market authorities have encouraged local workers to take short-term posts in agriculture, catering and construction. The modest economic recovery in 2006-7 does not seem to have led to increased labour immigration.

Under the ‘Green Card’ system set up in 2000 to attract highly-skilled workers (especially for the information technology sector), about 5000 persons had been admitted by February 2001. This was far less than the planned 20 000 recruits (OECD, 2001: 174-5). The shortfall appears to have been due to the limited duration of the work permits, and restrictions on family reunion. There is also some undocumented labour migration to Germany, although no official figures are available. In addition, many EU citizens live and work in Germany. Since they do not require work permits, their numbers are not known.

The *Aussiedler* were people of German ancestry whose ancestors have lived in Russia and Eastern Europe for centuries. Like the post-1945 expellees, they had the right to enter Germany and to claim citizenship. *Aussiedler* were generally of rural origin, and often had considerable problems of social adaptation and labour market entry. They were provided with a range of services and benefits to facilitate settlement, which acted as a powerful attracting factor. *Aussiedler* arrivals rose from
86,000 in 1987 to a peak of 397,000 in 1990. In the latter year, 148,000 were from the Soviet Union, 134,000 from Poland and 111,150 from Romania. At a time of social stress and growing unemployment, the influx of Aussiedler became unpopular. Despite the principle of free admission, the German government introduced an annual quota. Entries of Aussiedler declined to an average of around 220,000 per year from 1991 to 1995. Then quotas were cut further, with just 105,000 entries in 1999 (OECD, 2001: 170). By 2005, this type of entry had virtually ceased.

Overall, migration to Germany has declined due to economic conditions: unemployment has averaged 10-14 percent for the last ten years. For the first time, German authorities are encouraging skilled job-seekers to take jobs in countries like Austria, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. The German Labour Office now even provides preparation courses for work abroad. After nearly half a century of large-scale immigration, Germany has become a country of both immigration and emigration, with the latter currently slightly outweighing the former.

As this section has shown, both Australia and Germany have been major immigration countries. Australia has received well over 6 million immigrants since 1947. Although settlement was always planned, it has had unforeseen consequences: the ethnic composition of the population has changed in a way that was never intended by the architects of the migration programme. This has been partly because the need for labour during expansionary phases has dictated changes in recruitment policies. It has also been due to the way in which chain migration has led to self-sustaining migratory processes. Much of Germany’s foreign population is the legacy of guestworker recruitment in the 1960s and 1970s, but the asylum seeker entries of the 1990s, the growth of migration from Eastern and Central Europe and new flows from outside Europe have all led to increased population diversity. Altogether over 20 million people have migrated into Germany since 1945. The majority of foreign residents have lived in Germany over ten years, and are likely to stay permanently. The largest group is the 1.8 million Turks – nearly half of whom were actually born in Germany. Current movements are complex and unpredictable. Germany is once again becoming an emigration country, but immigration also continues.
Labour market incorporation

Up to about 1973, both Australian and German immigration policies were concerned with the recruitment of a manual labour force. Non-British migrants who received assisted passages to Australia were directed into jobs on construction sites such as the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme, in heavy industry, or in factories (Collins, 1991). Similarly, the German Federal Labour Office channelled foreign workers into unskilled and semi-skilled jobs on building sites and in factories, and used restrictionary labour permit rules to keep them there as long as possible.

The pre-1973 movements were mainly rural to urban migration: Mediterranean farmers and rural workers emigrated because of poverty, breakdown of social structures through war, and decline of local industries. Many intended to work temporarily in industrial economies, in order to use their earnings to improve their farms or set up small businesses upon return. Even in Australia, many Southern European workers expected to return home, and indeed did so in the 1960s and 1970s, as conditions improved in their countries of origin. However, in time, many migrant workers’ intentions changed when it became clear that it would not be possible to achieve their objectives in the home country as quickly as originally expected. The result was an increasing orientation towards long-term stay and occupational mobility in the immigration country (a trend which went hand in hand with family reunion: Piore, 1980: 50ff).

Workers found that, having entered the labour market at the bottom, it was hard to gain promotion. Migrants’ qualifications were often not recognized, forcing skilled workers into dead-end jobs. Typical workplaces for men were car assembly lines, construction sites and foundry work; and, for women, clothing, textiles and food processing. Service occupations such as catering, refuse collection, office cleaning and unskilled jobs in public utilities also became known as ‘migrant work’ (see Castles et al., 1984; Collins, 1991). The structural factors and discriminatory rules which led to initial low status caused enduring patterns of labour market segmentation. This applied particularly to migrant women, whose situation was affected both by patriarchal structures in the countries of origin and gender discrimination in the country of immigration. Their occupational status, wages and conditions were generally the worst of all groups in the labour market (Phizacklea,
Economic restructuring since the 1970s has brought significant changes, which are analysed in detail in Chapter 10 of *The Age of Migration*. The pre-1973 entrants bore the brunt of restructuring, as low-skilled jobs in manufacturing declined. OECD research has found that once older unskilled foreign workers are laid off in recessions, they have little chance of being re-employed (OECD, 1995: 37). As unskilled manufacturing jobs disappear, many immigrants lack the language skills and basic education needed for retraining (Baker and Wooden, 1992). In Australia unemployment during the recessions of 1974-5, 1982-3 and 1990-2 was significantly higher for non-English-speaking background (NESB) immigrants than for other workers (Ackland and Williams, 1992). Workers from English-speaking-background (ESB) countries fare better. The 1996 Census revealed unemployment rates of 10.9 per cent for NESB workers, 6.4 per cent for ESB workers and 7.8 per cent for the population as a whole. The unemployment rate for foreign-born men in Germany in 2005 was 17.5 per cent, substantially more than the rate of 10.6 per cent for native-born men. Foreign-born women had an unemployment rate of 16.3 percent, compared with 10.2 percent for native-born women (OECD, 2007: Annex Table I.A1.1).

Many of the new migrants no longer fit the old stereotype of the low-skilled migrant worker. In Australia, many immigrants from countries such as Taiwan, Korea, China, Hong Kong and Malaysia find work in skilled, professional and managerial occupations. New migrants are needed to make up for skill deficits, and are seen as vital for linking the Australian economy to the fast-growing ‘tiger economies’ of the region. Germany, like other EU countries, experiences increasing international interchange of managers and experts.

At the same time, the past segmentation of migrant workers into specific forms of work means that they cannot easily be replaced by local labour, even at times of high unemployment. Newcomers who enter as dependants, asylum seekers or refugees often provide labour for insecure and poorly-paid casual jobs in the growing informal sector. Recent recognition of the decline in fertility in Western countries is changing attitudes towards immigration, with some economists and policy-makers arguing that low-skilled ‘replacement migration’ will be needed to maintain future demographic balances and economic growth (UN, 2000).
Children of migrants who have obtained education and vocational training in the immigration country often secure better jobs than their parents. Australian research indicates substantial intergenerational mobility. For example, the 1991 Census showed that 18.8 per cent of male Australians of Greek parentage had university degrees, compared with only 2.5 per cent of their fathers. Several European immigrant groups appeared to share this pattern, although usually to a lesser extent (Birrell and Khoo, 1995). However, second-generation immigrants with poor educational qualifications have little chance of steady employment. Up to the 1980s many foreign children were failing in German schools, while few employers were willing to give them training places (Castles et al., 1984: Chapter 6). More recently school achievement rates have improved. However, a government commission found that there were still substantial deficits in both schooling and vocational training for children of immigrants (Süssmuth, 2001). This topic is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 10 of The Age of Migration.

When the original immigrants arrived in the 1950s and 1960s, it was easy to find entry-level jobs in industry. Such jobs are now few and far between, so that many young ethnic minority members face a future of casual work and frequent joblessness. Some groups and individuals break out of this situation, but many are caught in a vicious circle: initial incorporation in low-skilled work and residential areas with poor educational opportunities is reinforced by processes of racialization. Young job-seekers may be rejected because the combination of poor educational credentials, ethnic appearance and living in certain neighbourhoods has become a stigma, denoting marginality and unreliability (Häussermann and Kazapov, 1996: 361).

One route out of factory work is self-employment: ‘ethnic small business’ has become significant in virtually all industrial countries (Waldinger et al., 1990). By 1999, 263 000 foreign residents of Germany were classified as self-employed, along with 23 000 family workers (OECD, 2001: 175). In Australia, 26.7 per cent of self-employed people were foreign-born in 2005 – fairly consistent with the overall foreign-born share of the labour force. In Germany, 12.8 per cent of all self-employed people were foreign-born in 2005 (OECD, 2007, 75). Some migrant groups have higher rates of self-employment or business ownership than locally-born people. However, many small businesses fail, and the rate of self-exploitation (long working
hours, poor conditions, use of family labour power, insecurity) is high. Many ethnic entrepreneurs are concentrated in ‘ethnic niches’ such as retail trade, catering, construction and transport (Waldinger et al., 1990; Collins et al., 1995).

Community formation

In Germany, many foreign workers were at first housed by employers in hostels or camps near the work site. In Australia, the Department of Immigration provided hostels for new arrivals, and they often sought work and longer-term housing in the area nearby. As the need for family accommodation grew, migrants had to enter the general housing market. Several factors put them at a disadvantage. Most had low incomes and few savings. Early arrivals lacked local knowledge and informal networks. Some landlords refused to rent to migrants, while others made a business out of it, taking high rents for substandard and overcrowded accommodation. In some cases there was discrimination in the allocation of public housing, with rules that effectively excluded migrants, or put them at the end of long waiting lists (see Castles and Kosack, 1973: Chapter 7). Migrants therefore tended to become concentrated in the inner city or industrial areas where relatively low-cost housing was available. The quality of the accommodation and of the local social amenities (such as schools, health care facilities and recreational facilities) was often poor.

In Germany, such concentration persisted long after initial settlement. In Australia, where there is a strong tradition of owner-occupation, many migrants were able to improve their situation. By 1986, most Southern Europeans had bought their own homes by means of frugal living and working long hours, and their rate of owner-occupation was actually higher than for the Australian-born population (ABS, 1989). Many still remained in the original areas of settlement, though some had moved to outer suburbs. Newer groups, such as Indo-Chinese immigrants, were also following a similar trajectory.

There has been much debate in both countries about the formation of ‘ethnic ghettos’. In fact, unlike the USA, there are very few areas with predominantly minority populations in either country. Rather we find class-based segregation, with migrants sharing certain areas with disadvantaged groups of the local population: low-income workers, the unemployed, social security recipients and pensioners. However,
there are neighbourhoods where a specific ethnic group is large enough to have a decisive effect on its appearance, culture and social structure. The Turkish community of Kreuzberg in West Berlin is a well-known example. In Australia, a marked Italian atmosphere can be found in the Carlton area of Melbourne, or in the Leichhardt and Fairfield areas of Sydney. There are Chinatowns in the centre of Melbourne and Sydney, and Indo-Chinese neighbourhoods have developed in Richmond (Melbourne) and Cabramatta (Sydney).

Residential segregation of migrants has a double character: on the one hand, it can mean poor housing and social amenities, as well as relative isolation from the majority population; on the other hand, it offers the opportunity for community formation and the development of ethnic infrastructure and institutions. The most visible sign of this development is the establishment of shops, cafés, and agencies that cater for migrants’ special needs. ‘Ethnic professionals’ - health practitioners, lawyers, accountants - also find opportunities in such areas. Small business owners and professionals form the core of ethnic middle classes, and take on leadership roles in associations. Welfare organizations cater for special needs of immigrants, sometimes compensating for gaps in existing social services. Social associations establish meeting places. Cultural associations aim to preserve homeland languages, folklore and tradition, and set up mother-tongue or religious classes. Political associations of all complexions struggle for influence within the community. Often their starting point is the politics of the country of origin, but with increasing length of stay their aims become more oriented to the country of immigration.

Religion plays a major part in community formation. Sometimes migrants can join existing structures: for instance, many Southern Europeans in Germany and Australia became attached to Catholic Churches. However, they sometimes found that religion was practised in ways not sensitive to their needs (Alcorso et al., 1992: 110-12). Often priests or religious orders (such as the Scalabrinians from Italy) accompanied the migrants, giving churches in areas of migrant settlement a new character. Orthodox Christians from Greece, Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe had to establish their own churches and religious communities. In recent years, the most significant religious development has been connected with migrations of Muslims: Turks and North Africans to Germany; Lebanese, Turks and Malaysians to Australia.
The establishment of mosques and religious associations has had a high priority. Bhuddist, Hindu and Bahá’í temples can also be found in what were formerly almost exclusively Christian countries.

Such developments can be found in all countries of immigration. They are at the nexus of the migratory process, where transitory migrant groups metamorphose into ethnic communities. Establishing community networks and institutions means an at least partially conscious decision to start ‘placemaking’ and building a new identity (Pascoe, 1992). Community formation is linked to awareness of long-term or permanent stay, to the birth and schooling of children in the country of immigration, to the role of women as ‘cultural custodians’ and above all to the coming of age of the second generation (Vasta, 1992). In Germany, growing awareness of the long-term nature of stay led to the formation of Turkish associations (Kastoryano, 1996). Though many had an Islamic character, they were increasingly aimed at obtaining social and political rights in Germany. Moreover, they were linked to a new collective identity that found expression in the demand for dual citizenship: that is, the recognition of being both Turkish and German.

The concept of the ethnic community plays a central part in debates on assimilation and multiculturalism. Community formation is not a mechanistic or predetermined process, and not all migrants form communities: for instance, one cannot speak of an English community in Australia, or an Austrian community in Germany. Community formation is not just concerned with cultural maintenance, but is also a strategy to cope with social disadvantage and to provide protection from racism. The relationships and institutions which make up the community are initially based on individual and group needs. However, as economic enterprises, cultural and social associations, and religious and political groups develop, a consciousness of the community emerges. This process is in no way homogeneous; rather it is based on struggles for power, prestige and control. The ethnic community can best be conceived as a changing, complex and contradictory network. It is most intense and easily identifiable at the neighbourhood level, but is in turn linked to wider networks at the national level and beyond. Ethnic communities may take on a transnational character, and provide the basis for communicative networks which unite people across borders and generations (see Chapter 2).
Legal frameworks and government policies

There are important parallels in the migratory process in Australia and Germany, but the laws and policies shaping the position of immigrants in society were very different until recently. The differences were linked to varying historical experiences of nation-state formation. The Australian model embodies a territorial concept of the nation appropriate to a former settler colony: if immigration rules allow a person to become a permanent resident, then citizenship policy allows him or her to become a member of the political community and of the nation. By contrast, when the German Reich emerged as the first modern German state in 1871, nationality was defined not through territoriality, but through ethnicity as shown by language and culture. A person could only obtain German nationality by being born into the German community, so that ‘blood’ became a label for ethnicity. Until 2000, German citizenship was based on *ius sanguinis* (law of the blood, or nationality through descent). Millions of foreigners became part of society, but were excluded from the state and nation. This was the rationale behind the seemingly absurd slogan ‘the FRG is not a country of immigration’ (see Hoffmann, 1990).

In Australia, family reunion was accepted from the outset, and newcomers were encouraged to become Australian citizens. The initial five-year waiting period for naturalization was reduced to three and then two years. Today, two-thirds of immigrants who have been in Australia over two years are Australian citizens. Citizenship is based primarily on *ius soli* (law of the soil, or nationality based on birth in a territory), so that children born to legal immigrants in Australia are automatically citizens. Immigrants who become Australian citizens may retain their former nationality, so that dual citizenship is common. However, in 2007, the Liberal-National Coalition Government increased the waiting period for naturalization to four years, and introduced a Citizenship Test – apparently a reversal of Australia’s historical trend towards easy access to citizenship.

For Germany there are two separate legal frameworks. The first applies to people of German ethnic descent such as post-1945 expellees and refugees and current *Aussiedler*. They have a right to citizenship, and are not considered foreigners. The second framework applies to foreigners. A long residence requirement, restrictive conditions and complicated procedures kept naturalizations low. Foreigners seeking
naturalization had to renounce their previous nationality. By the mid-1980s over 3 million foreigners fulfilled the ten-year residence qualification, but only about 14 000 per year actually obtained citizenship (Funcke, 1991). Children born to foreign parents had no automatic right to German citizenship, and the great majority of immigrants and their descendants remained non-citizens.

In the period following German reunification in 1990, restrictive citizenship rules were identified as a major obstacle to social and political integration, especially for youths of immigrant background. Immigrants and anti-racist organizations campaigned for easier naturalization. A key demand was for the right to dual citizenship. Some immigrant groups, especially Turks, were not permitted by the government of origin to give up the previous nationality. In any case, renouncing the previous affiliation could involve both material loss (with regard to land ownership) and psychological difficulties.

The Social Democrat-Green Coalition that came to power in 1998 announced that it would reform naturalization law, and permit dual citizenship. This met with strong opposition from conservative groups. The 1999 citizenship law (which took effect in 2000) represents a major shift towards *ius soli*, but stops short of allowing dual citizenship. Foreign immigrants have a right to naturalization after eight years residence, providing they renounce their previous nationality, have not been convicted of a serious offence, are able to support themselves and their families, acquire basic proficiency in German and declare allegiance to the Basic Law. Children born to foreign parents in Germany acquire citizenship at birth if at least one parent has lived legally in Germany for at least eight years. They can hold dual citizenship until they reach maturity, but have to decide between their German and other citizenship by the age of 23. Despite the prohibition of dual citizenship, many exceptions are allowed - there were estimated to be 1.2 million dual citizens in the early 1990s (Çinar, 1994: 54), and the number has certainly grown since then.

The number of naturalizations increased sharply, reaching a peak of 187 000 in 2000, and then declined to 117 000 in 2005 (OECD, 2007, Table B.1.6). This may indicate that a backlog of people seeking German citizenship has been cleared. In any case, birthright citizenship for children born to immigrant parents may reduce future demand for naturalization. In this area, one can observe some convergence between
the Australian and the German approaches to immigration and citizenship.

However, the fundamental differences in views on immigration and incorporation into society prevailing until recently helped shape many aspects of public policy. The Australian model for managing diversity had two main stages. In the 1950s, the government introduced a policy of assimilationism, based on the doctrine that non-British immigrants could be culturally and socially absorbed, and become indistinguishable from the existing population. The central principle of assimilationism was the treatment of migrants as ‘New Australians’, who would live and work with Anglo-Australians and rapidly become citizens. There was no special educational provision for migrant children, who were to be brought up as Australians. Cultural pluralism and the formation of ‘ethnic ghettos’ were to be avoided at all costs.

By the 1960s, it became clear that assimilationism was not working, due to labour market segmentation, residential segregation and community formation. By the 1970s, political parties were also beginning to discover the political potential of the ‘ethnic vote’. Assimilationism was replaced by multiculturalism: the idea that ethnic communities, which maintain the languages and cultures of the areas of origin, were legitimate and consistent with Australian citizenship, as long as certain principles (such as respect for basic institutions and democratic values) were adhered to. In addition, multiculturalism meant recognition of the need for special laws, institutions and social policies to overcome barriers to full participation of various ethnic groups in society (OMA, 1989).

In Germany there was no question of assimilation. The Federal Labour Office granted work permits and ‘guestworkers’ were controlled by a network of bureaucracies. The Ausländerpolizei (foreigners’ police) issued residence permits, kept foreign workers under surveillance and deported those who offended against the rules. The personnel departments of the employers provided basic social services and managed company hostels. To deal with personal or family problems of foreign workers, the government provided funding to church and private welfare bodies (see Castles and Kosack, 1973). By the 1970s, foreign children were entering German schools in large numbers. The educational authorities introduced a ‘dual strategy’ designed both to integrate foreign children temporarily during their stay in Germany,
and to prepare them for return to their country of origin. The result was a system of ‘national classes’, ‘preparatory classes’ and ‘mother-tongue classes’ which separated foreign from German students, and prevented many foreign children from achieving educational success (see Castles et al., 1984: Chapter 6). Family reunion also meant that workers were leaving company accommodation and seeking housing in the inner cities. The result was a debate on a ‘foreigners’ policy’ which was to continue until the beginning of the twenty-first century, after which it was largely replaced by new debates on immigration and integration policies.

After reunification in 1990, the myth of not being ‘a country of immigration’ became unsustainable (see Bade, 1994). After the murder of several Turkish immigrants in arson attacks in Mölln in 1992 and Solingen in 1993, there were large anti-racist demonstrations all over Germany. The demands for political and social integration of immigrants led to the reform of citizenship law mentioned above. However, the left remained ambivalent about multiculturalism. Some see it negatively as a model for cementing the identity of ethnic groups, and for maintaining cultures perceived as anti-modern and repressive, especially towards women, although others on the left support multiculturalism as a way of enriching German cultural life (Cohn-Bendit and Schmid, 1993). Conservatives now generally favour models designed to achieve economic and social integration, in the hope that this will lead to cultural assimilation in the long run.

In 2000, the German government appointed a commission to advise on immigration, chaired by a leading Christian Democratic Union (CDU) politician, Rita Süssmuth. The Commission’s report declared that Germany had, in fact, been a country of immigration for many years, and that Germany needed immigrants for both demographic and economic reasons. The Commission proposed a planned immigration system to encourage recruitment of skilled personnel. It also advocated a comprehensive integration policy to overcome social disadvantages suffered by immigrants. The goal was to achieve full participation in society, while respecting cultural diversity. This policy required reforms and special measures in education, social welfare, the labour market, and other areas (Süssmuth, 2001).

Germany’s first Immigration Law was passed in 2004. This was designed to establish a modern system of migration management. It also paved the way for
integration courses providing German language teaching as well as an introduction to the country’s laws, history and culture. Such courses are compulsory for certain categories of new entrants and existing foreign residents. Together with the 1999 Citizenship Law, the 2004 Immigration Law can be seen as a major shift in German approaches to immigration and settlement. In addition, European Union regulations have led to the introduction of equal opportunities rules and measures to combat discrimination and racism (see Chapter 10 of *The Age of Migration*). Yet the combined effects of such steps still fall far short of the comprehensive reforms advocated by the Süssmuth Commission. In the current negative climate of economic stagnation and concern about security issues, such radical changes seem unlikely.

**Interaction with the society of the receiving country**

The attitudes and actions of the population and state of the country of immigration have crucial effects on the migratory process. In turn, community formation may modify or reinforce these effects. In both countries the control of migrant labour by the state, and its incorporation by employers, set the initial conditions for settlement processes. Discrimination in hiring and promotion, non-recognition of skills, and regulations explicitly designed to limit migrant workers’ right to equal treatment in the labour market can be seen as forms of institutional racism. Local workers and their unions generally supported such discrimination, at least initially. Australian unions only agreed to recruitment of Eastern and Southern Europeans in the 1940s after being given official guarantees that they would not compete with local workers for jobs and housing (Collins, 1991: 22-3). German unions demanded that foreign workers should get the same pay and conditions as Germans doing the same jobs, but also supported discriminatory ‘guestworker’ regulations, which ensured that most foreigners got inferior positions (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 129).

Attitudes of local workers towards migrants were part of a wider picture. Many Australians were highly suspicious of foreigners. In everyday terms this meant reluctance to rent housing to migrants or to have them as neighbours, hostility towards anyone speaking a foreign language in public, mistrust of visible foreign groups and resentment towards foreign children at school. However, the 1960s and the 1970s were years of growing acceptance of difference, due to the recognized contribution of immigration to economic growth and prosperity. This permitted such dramatic
changes as the abolition of the White Australia Policy, the first large-scale Asian entries into the country and the introduction of multicultural policies.

In the 1980s, there were attacks by public figures and sections of the media against Asian immigration and multiculturalism. These corresponded with increases in racist violence against Aboriginal people and Asians (HREOC, 1991). However, the ALP government took a strong anti-racist line, and there was considerable public support for multiculturalism. After the 1996 Federal Election, however, anti-minority politics gained new prominence through the rise of the One Nation Party, and the Liberal-National government did little to combat racism or to support multiculturalism. Indeed, cuts in services for Aborigines and immigrants were a part of its policy, and the onslaught on multiculturalism seemed to reflect a desire to return to a more traditional monocultural identity.

In Germany, most social groups supported the ‘guestworker’ system at first, although there was informal discrimination, such as refusal to rent to foreigners, or exclusion from bars and dance halls. An escalation of racism came in the 1970s, when unemployment of Germans became a problem for the first time since the ‘economic miracle’. The Turks had become the largest and most visible group, and attitudes towards them were shaped by fear of Islam, which remains a powerful historical force in central European cultures. Reunification in 1990 was accompanied by vast population movements and by growing economic and social uncertainty, particularly in the area of the former GDR. The result was widespread hostility towards immigrants and an upsurge of organized racist violence. After the events of 11 September 2001 in the USA, Muslim minorities were increasingly perceived as threats to German security and culture, and Islamophobia became a major theme in public discourse.

The visible emergence of ethnic communities influenced public attitudes, as well as state policies. For people who fear the competition of migrants or who feel threatened by difference, the existence of communities may confirm the idea that ‘they are taking over’. Ethnic areas can become the target for organized racist attacks, and ethnic minorities can become the focus for extreme right mobilization. On the other hand, contact with new cultures and some of their more accessible symbols, such as food and entertainment, may break down prejudices. Where ethnic small
business and community efforts rehabilitate inner-city neighbourhoods, good inter-
group relationships may develop.

Complex links emerged between ethnic communities and the wider society. Local
branches of political parties in ethnic community areas needed foreign members, and
had to take account of their needs in order to attract votes. For instance, the ALP set
up Greek branches in Melbourne in the 1970s. Unions needed to attract immigrant
members; they hired immigrant organizers and published multilingual information
material. Churches found that they had to overcome barriers, and work with mosques
and Islamic associations if they were to maintain their traditional social role. Artists
and cultural workers among minorities and the majority found they could enrich their
creativity by learning from each other. Multifaceted new social networks developed in
the ethnic community areas of the cities. These gave members of the majority
population greater understanding of the social situation and culture of the minorities,
and formed the basis for movements opposed to exploitation and racism.

Similar tendencies prevailed in the public sector. Both the German and the
Australian state experimented with using ethnic associations as instruments for the
delivery of social services, such as counselling, family welfare and youth work. Aims
and methods differed so the relationship was often an uneasy one. Government
agencies sometimes saw traditionalist ethnic organizations as effective instruments of
social control of workers, young people or women. On the other hand, ethnic leaders
might use their new role to preserve traditional authority, and slow down cultural and
political change. The state could choose which ethnic leaders to work with and which
to ignore, and reward desired behaviour through patronage and funding (Jakubowicz,
1989; Castles et al., 1992a: 65-71). But cooption was a two-way process: state
agencies tried to use ethnic community structures and associations, but had to make
concessions in return. Cooption took place earlier in Australia than in Germany. In
Australia, ethnic leaderships had an important power base and the ‘ethnic vote’ was
thought to affect the outcome of elections (Castles et al., 1992b: 131-3). In Germany,
members of ethnic communities lacked political clout and were perceived as not
really belonging to society.

The main expression of the Australian approach was to be found in the policy of
multiculturalism, with its network of consultative bodies, special agencies and equal
opportunities legislation which developed between 1973 and 1996. The 1996-2007 Liberal-National coalition government had strong reservations about multiculturalism, and dismantled many of the special institutions and services. However, in 1999, the government launched *A New Agenda for Multicultural Australia* (DIMA, 1999), which largely endorsed the principles of the ALP’s 1989 multicultural policy statement (OMA, 1989). The debate continues today, and the policy of the new ALP Government has yet to be fully defined.

In Germany, a Federal Government Office for Foreigners has existed (in various guises) since the late 1970s. This agency had mainly provided public information, and appears to have had limited influence on policy. But there are trends towards recognizing ethnic associations and incorporating them into policy initiatives. In Berlin, Frankfurt and elsewhere ‘commissions for foreigners’ or ‘offices for multicultural affairs’ have been set up. These are seeking to build structures to work with ethnic community groups and to propagate legal and administrative reforms. A sort of ‘de facto multiculturalism’ has been emerging since the 1970s, especially in local educational and social work initiatives. This is not surprising, in view of the fact that foreigners make up a substantial proportion of the population in major cities, ranging from 30 per cent in Frankfurt, to 24 per cent in Stuttgart and Munich, and 13 per cent in Berlin (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung, 2000). It is hard to see how social integration can be improved, without some form of policy designed to recognize cultural diversity.

**Conclusions**

The validity of a comparison between Australia and Germany can be questioned by arguing that Australia is a ‘classical country of immigration’, while Germany is a ‘historical nation’ and not a ‘country of immigration’. This argument does not stand up to analysis. Both countries have experienced mass immigration. Germany has had over 20 million immigrants since 1945, one of the biggest population movements to any country ever. Australia - with immigration of over 6 million people since 1945 - has had a very high inflow relative to its small population. Both countries initially recruited migrant workers in roughly the same areas at the same time. Whatever the intentions of policy-makers, both movements led to similar patterns of labour market segmentation, residential segregation and ethnic group formation. In both cases, racist
attitudes and behaviour on the part of some sections of the receiving population have been problems for immigrants. Thus there are great similarities in the migratory process, despite the differences in policies and attitudes. These parallels are important because, if these apparently opposing examples show corresponding patterns, it should be possible also to find them for other countries, which are somewhere between these cases on the migration spectrum.

But the differences are also significant and require analysis. They go back to the different historical concepts of the nation and to the intentions of the post-war migration programmes. The Australian authorities wanted permanent settlement, and went to considerable lengths to persuade the public of the need for this. Chain migration and family reunion were therefore seen as legitimate, and the model for settlement was based on citizenship, full rights and assimilation. Assimilationism eventually failed in its declared goal of cultural homogenization, but it did provide the conditions for successful settlement and the later shift to multiculturalism.

The German government planned temporary labour recruitment without settlement, and passed this expectation on to the public. Official policies were unable to prevent settlement and community formation. But these policies (and the persistent failure to adapt them to changing conditions) did lead to marginalization and exclusion of immigrants. The results can be summed up by saying that the Australian model led to the formation of ethnic communities which were seen by many as an integral part of a changing nation, while the German model led to ethnic minorities, which were generally not seen as a legitimate part of a nation unwilling to accept a change in its identity. This is an oversimplification, for there are ethnic minorities in Australia too: Aboriginal people and some non-European groups. All the same, the distinction does capture an essential difference in the outcomes of the two models.

Such comparisons show the usefulness of the concept of the migratory process. It means looking at all the dimensions of migration and settlement, in relation to political, economic, and social and cultural practices and structures in the societies concerned. If the architects of the post-war European ‘guestworker systems’ had studied the migratory process in their own histories or elsewhere, they would not have held the naive belief that they could turn flows of migrant labour on and off as with a tap. They would have understood that movement of workers almost always leads to
family reunion and permanent settlement. The very fears of permanent ethnic minorities held by some governments turned into self-fulfilling prophecies: by denying legitimacy to family reunion and settlement, governments ensured that these processes would take place under unfavourable circumstances, leading to deep divisions in society.

Since the mid-1990s, attitudes and policies in both Australia and Germany have changed dramatically. Australia has abandoned its traditional open attitude to refugees and family reunion. The government has taken a much narrower view of ‘national interests’ with regard to immigration, and has mobilized considerable public support for this change. Multicultural policies have been watered down, although not altogether abandoned. Germany has at last abandoned the ideology of not being a country of immigration, and seems to be moving towards a more open immigration policy and a more inclusive approach to integration. It would be misleading to see these changes in terms of convergence. Instead, they appear as specific political strategies, linked to complex domestic and international factors. Nonetheless, the changes reflect the breakdown of traditional national models of immigration and citizenship in the context of the globalization of migration.

**Guide to further reading**


report of the Süssmuth Commission (2001) contains a great deal of information and analysis, and is available in German and English.

Up to date and policy information can be found for Australia on the website of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship: http://www.immi.gov.au/

The Australian Bureau of Statistics is also a valuable source: http://www.abs.gov.au/

The website for the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees is at http://www.bamf.de/

Valuable information on German migration can also be found on the Federal Ministry of the Interior website: http://www.zuwanderung.de/

As always, useful comparative material can be found in the publications of the OED and the IOM, and on the website of the Migration Information Source: http://www.migrationinformation.org/index.cfm/

References for 2008 website version


Castles, S. and Kosack, G. (1973) Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western
Europe (London: Oxford University Press).


Süßmuth, R. (2001) Zuwanderung gestalten, Integration fördern: Bericht der
unabhängigen Kommission 'Zuwanderung' German Government Report (Berlin: Bundesminister des Innern).


